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HAS THE MORTGAGE PENDULUM SWUNG 
TOO FAR? REVIVING ACCESS TO 
MORTGAGE CREDIT 
PATRICIA A. MCCOY* 
Abstract: In the wake of the financial crisis, mortgage lending to lower-income 
and minority borrowers overcorrected and has not recovered. Although home-
ownership is a riskier investment than previously realized, still it remains a prov-
en path to increased wealth on balance for lower-income households. There are a 
number of reasonable reforms that could achieve greater access to credit while 
containing default risk. These include strategies to reduce down payments safely 
and to keep monthly payments manageable, combined with fixed-rate loans. Pre-
purchase counseling is important to preparing applicants for the financial de-
mands of homeownership and strengthening their credit histories, while rapid 
foreclosure prevention counseling can reduce foreclosures dramatically for bor-
rowers who miss payments. In addition, larger, structural changes to the lending 
industry, mortgage regulation, and housing finance are needed to remove artifi-
cial institutional barriers to the flow of responsible credit. In the short term, these 
include countercyclical rules to minimize credit bubbles and investor reforms to 
alleviate lenders’ liability concerns for inadvertent misrepresentations and minor 
underwriting errors affecting loans. In the longer term, mortgage finance could 
be re-envisioned to integrate housing counselors, real estate professionals, and 
economists into the mortgage supply chain to produce better borrowing decisions 
at favorable pricing. Closing the circle, ensuring an adequate supply of affordable 
rentals would give lower-income households the flexibility they need to make the 
right housing decisions for their personal circumstances at each stage of their 
lives. 
INTRODUCTION 
Starting in 2007, the United States experienced a sharp decline in home 
mortgage originations, leading to a serious overcorrection of credit. The situa-
tion is slowly improving, with mortgage originations on the upswing since first 
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quarter 2014 in total dollar volume. (US Mortgage Originations). Nevertheless, 
lenders are still too risk averse and millions of lower-income and minority 
households who would normally qualify are unable to get mortgages. 
Why should we care that the mortgage pendulum swung too far? Obvi-
ously, the homeownership proposition has become more freighted since the 
financial crisis of 2008. The collapse in home values and the ensuing wave of 
foreclosures were a shocking reminder of the financial risks that come with 
homeownership and the mortgage debt that most people incur to acquire a 
home. Yet despite those risks, the evidence shows that purchasing a home re-
mains a powerful path—many would say the most powerful path—to building 
wealth for families of modest means. (Herbert, McCue & Sanchez-Moyano 
2016, 6–7). 
This symposium issue asserts that society needs to redouble its commit-
ment to access to mortgage credit while doing it smarter. The challenge going 
forward is to expand mortgage financing to underserved, creditworthy borrow-
ers while boosting the success rate of mortgages for borrowers, lenders, and 
communities. 
In this issue, a talented array of housing finance experts diagnose the ob-
stacles to affordable lending today and propose innovative solutions for mak-
ing mortgage credit more sustainable. Although progress has been made to 
date (particularly in the area of consumer protection), much more needs to be 
done. Fortunately, there is a wealth of new data from pilot projects around the 
country on better ways to underwrite and deliver mortgages and to prepare 
new homeowners for the financial demands of owning homes. Our symposium 
authors report on a number of those findings and propose new policies to ex-
pand the opportunities for successful homeownership. Their recommendations 
span the entire lending process, from loan products, counseling, and underwrit-
ing to servicing, the business model of lending, and broader macroeconomic 
and environmental factors. In this foreword, I preview and comment on the 
contributions to this issue by the symposium authors. 
This symposium issue grows out of a conference titled Has the Mortgage 
Pendulum Swung Too Far?, held by the Rappaport Center for Law and Public 
Policy at Boston College Law School on September 30, 2016. I am especially 
grateful to the Rappaport Center’s founders, Jerry and Phyllis Rappaport, for 
their heartwarming encouragement and generous support. Many others gener-
ously gave of their time and effort to make the conference and this symposium 
issue possible. Above all, we thank Elisabeth Medvedow, the Executive Direc-
tor of the Rappaport Center, Professor Michael Cassidy, the Center’s faculty 
adviser, Vincent Rougeau, the Dean of Boston College Law School, Hillary 
Bylicki, John Gordon, Judy Yi, the superb Brittany Campbell and the other 
outstanding student editors of the Boston College Journal of Law & Social 
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Justice, Judy Jacobson at the Massachusetts Housing Partnership, and our 
symposium speakers and commentators. 
I. TIGHT MORTGAGE CREDIT AND THE DECLINING HOMEOWNERSHIP RATE 
Where does access to mortgage credit stand today? The total annual dollar 
volume of home mortgage originations sharply declined when the housing 
bubble burst starting in first quarter 2007. But since then, residential mortgage 
lending in the U.S. has improved in overall terms for the last three and a half 
years. Originations staged a recovery in first quarter 2014 and have been on 
the rise ever since. (US Mortgage Originations). 
However, total origination volumes do not answer the question posed by 
this symposium, which is the extent to which historically underserved custom-
ers, including lower-income households and minorities, are able to get mort-
gage loans. In the opening article, Laurie Goodman tackles that issue by con-
structing an index that measures the level of risk assumed by residential lend-
ers pre- and post-crisis. (Goodman 2017, 237, 252). The index gauges the mar-
ket’s appetite for risk by comparing the risk levels of home mortgage origina-
tions during and after the crisis with those in 2001–2002, when lending stand-
ards were reasonable. According to Goodman, lenders’ risk appetite plunged 
beginning in 2007. By second quarter 2016, the mortgage market was assum-
ing less than half the credit risk it took on in 2001. (Id., Figure 3). 
This tightening has been so pronounced, Goodman warns, that “[m]any 
loans are not being made that should be” made. (Id., 238). In earlier work, she 
and colleagues estimated that up to 6.3 million more mortgage loans would 
have been made between 2009 and 2015 if the credit standards prevailing in 
2001 had been used. (Goodman, Zhu & Bai 2016). Households with FICO 
scores1 below 700 have been especially hard hit by the credit crunch and mort-
gages have become next to impossible to secure for most applicants with FICO 
scores below 660. (Bhutta 2015, 291; Goodman 2017, 239). Because Hispanic 
and nonwhite households have lower credit scores, wealth, and incomes on 
average than non-Hispanic white households, today’s tight credit conditions 
disproportionately hurt people of color. 
This credit contraction helped depress the U.S. homeownership rate to its 
lowest level in fifty years. (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). In their contri-
bution to this issue, Jonathan Spader and Christopher Herbert document the 
decline in U.S. homeownership that accompanied the tightening of mortgage 
credit. (Spader & Herbert 2017, 267–68). In the mid-1980s, the national 
homeownership rate began a long climb from 63.9% in 1985 to a high of 
69.2% in 2004, before slumping to 63.7% in 2015. (Federal Reserve Bank of 
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St. Louis). Although the U.S. population became older and more racially and 
ethnically diverse over this period, Spader and Herbert find that these demo-
graphic shifts had relatively little effect on the drop in homeownership. In-
stead, they conclude, evictions due to foreclosure, macroeconomic trends, 
swings in the availability of mortgage credit, and possibly household attitudes 
contributed to the homeownership boom and bust. 
The homeownership trends that Spader and Herbert document have seri-
ous implications for the racial wealth gap. From 2002 to 2015, the homeown-
ership gap between black and white households widened. (Spader & Herbert 
2017, Figure 1). Goodman is concerned that the gap will become worse, based 
on her prediction that the homeownership rate will continue to decline. Spader 
and Herbert agree that a further decline is possible, in part due to the continued 
foreclosure backlog and lagging home purchases by young adults. If home-
ownership continues to fall, the largest adverse impact will fall on minority 
households, particularly black families, according to all three authors. 
II. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO BARRIERS TO CREDIT 
To summarize, mortgage credit tightened sharply during the Great Reces-
sion, most heavily affecting minority households. In some ways, this contrac-
tion in credit is paradoxical. One might have expected the volume of home 
loans to grow post-2008, when interest rates fell to historic lows and lower 
housing prices made homes more affordable. (Quercia & Riley 2017, 315). 
Despite these favorable home-buying conditions, the opposite occurred. 
So what explains this credit contraction and its effect on underserved 
groups? Multiple factors are at work, including continued uncertainty over the 
path of housing finance reform. The job of untangling these various factors 
will continue for years. As part of that effort, this symposium issue examines 
several major reasons for the drop in access to home loans, including the back-
log of foreclosures, impaired credit, reduced originations to young adults, risk 
aversion by consumers and lenders, and the obsolete business model of for-
profit mortgage lenders. 
A. The Role of Foreclosures and Slow Household Formation by Young 
Adults 
Although initial research has been done on demand-side factors in the re-
cent decline in mortgage originations, those dynamics are not well understood. 
Neil Bhutta (Bhutta 2015, 295) finds some evidence of lower consumer de-
mand for home mortgages post-crisis. Spader and Herbert explore two factors 
that may have demand-side implications, one being the high rate of residential 
foreclosures after the housing market’s collapse and the other being the re-
duced number of originations to younger households. 
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1. Foreclosures 
According to estimates by Spader and Herbert, foreclosures resulted in 
the ouster of 4.8 to 5.8 million homeowners between second quarter 2005 and 
first quarter 2015. They conclude that foreclosures accounted for at least half 
of the decline in homeownership over that ten-year period. 
What is uncertain is the extent to which these foreclosures translated into 
lower demand for home mortgages. Some of the borrowers foreclosed on may 
have lost their desire for future homeownership and reverted to renting long-
term. Their exit from the homeownership market would reflect reduced de-
mand for mortgage loans. Other borrowers who went through foreclosure may 
have remained interested in buying another home, but could not qualify for a 
mortgage for several years due to damaged credit histories and credit scores. 
(Brevoort & Cooper 2013, 761). To the extent that tighter lending standards 
blocked their eligibility for loans even once their credit improved, that would 
be a supply-side effect. 
Regardless of the relative contribution of supply-side and demand-side 
factors, Spader and Herbert’s findings about the magnitude of foreclosures and 
their role in last decade’s homeownership rate decline are disquieting, particu-
larly given the disruption and damage that foreclosures inflict. For affected 
households, foreclosures result in eviction, lost wealth, and frequently also 
dislocations in schooling and in health. (Been et al. 2011, 410; Bucks & Brick-
er 2013, 7–8; Burd-Sharps & Rasch 2015, 14; Currie & Tekin 2015, 86; Man-
turuk et al. 2017, chs. 2–3). Affected lenders and investors will probably sus-
tain losses and may face insolvency. Foreclosures further impose heavy nega-
tive externalities. On a local level, foreclosures depress neighboring property 
values and increase crime (Rogers & Winter 2009, 456, 457), while nationally, 
large-scale foreclosures jeopardized the nation’s financial stability in 2008. 
(Campbell 2013, 4–5). By illuminating the pernicious effect of foreclosures on 
homeownership, the authors remind us of the importance of curbs on reckless 
credit and housing price bubbles, particularly now that memories of the 2008 
financial crisis are rapidly fading. 
2. Falling Mortgage Originations to Younger Adults 
Spader and Herbert also report that households under 35 had the largest 
drop in home purchases of any age group between 2005 and 2015. In their 
view, foreclosures do not explain what happened to that age group, which is 
not particularly surprising because many of these individuals were still too 
young to buy homes when the housing boom peaked in 2005. Instead, other 
factors explain younger adults’ delayed entry into homeownership. Symposium 
author Edward Kane points to the poor employment prospects of many young 
adults after 2008, the trend toward later marriage and childbearing, and the 
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uptick in younger adults who are living with their parents at home as reasons 
for younger people’s depressed home mortgage rates. (Kane 2017, 296). Rising 
student debt may have had an effect as well. (Mezza et al. 2016, 20). 
B. Lender Constraints 
There has been much more research on the supply-side reasons for the 
contraction in credit. This issue highlights three of those reasons: concerns on 
the part of lenders about liability exposure, rising servicing costs, and the anti-
quated business model of for-profit mortgage lending. 
1. Lender Concerns About Legal Exposure and Servicing Goals 
Laurie Goodman asks the question, why did credit to low- and moderate-
income consumers become so tight? In her view, the problem is that lenders 
placed further credit overlays on top of the Federal National Mortgage Associ-
ation (“Fannie Mae”), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Fred-
die Mac”), and Federal Housing Administration (FHA) credit standards.2 
Goodman identifies three reasons why lenders became so conservative in the 
current business climate. First were buyback claims by investors for breach of 
representations and warranties on loans. Second were concerns about open-
ended liability to the U.S. government under the False Claims Act for misrep-
resentations in FHA loans. Finally, lenders became concerned about the 
mounting costs of servicing distressed loans. To avoid these problems going 
forward, lenders made a decision to restrict loans to the safest borrowers and 
scoured those loans to make sure that the transactions are free from errors. 
In an effort to encourage lenders to relax their grip on credit, Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and FHA have taken steps, which Goodman describes, to reduce 
originators’ liability exposure and to reduce servicers’ cost of servicing delin-
quent loans. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have made substantially more pro-
gress than FHA in both respects, however. As a result, lenders remain wary of 
making FHA loans and some lenders have exited the FHA market altogether. 
This pullback represents a particular blow to applicants with weaker credit pro-
files because FHA loans are specifically intended to accommodate their need 
for low down payments and flexible underwriting at a cheaper price than Fan-
nie or Freddie loans. 
Goodman’s critique engages the larger and as-yet unresolved debate over 
the wisdom of civil and criminal liability for misrepresentations in mortgage 
lending. Edward J. Kane takes the opposite view from Goodman, who is con-
cerned about over-deterrence and a pullback in affordable credit when lenders 
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are punished for inadvertent errors. (Kane 2017, 297–98). Kane argues, in con-
trast, that mortgage fraud laws are so weak that they “invite[] mortgage profes-
sionals to lie.” He would amend the laws against mortgage misrepresentations 
to relax the required showing for civil and criminal intent. Specifically, where 
mortgage professionals provide false information while acting in a professional 
capacity and receiving compensation for their services, Kane would impose 
liability where those professionals “knew or should have known” that the in-
formation was false. 
2. The Broken Business Model of Banks 
Symposium author Lisa Davis points to separate problems driving the de-
cline in mortgages by big banks to low- and moderate-income households, 
which are inefficiencies and excessive costs in the mortgage supply chain. 
(Davis 2017, 303–05). Currently, she explains, the origination costs to banks 
for mortgages of $100,000 or less are too high to make those mortgages profit-
able. Expensive marketing costs and commissions are partly to blame, plus the 
obsolete, paper-based technology used by the home mortgage industry. Fur-
ther, there is no communication channel along the chain that incorporates the 
risk mitigation offered by housing counselors at the origination phase into sec-
ondary market pricing. The rest of her article envisions what a modern mort-
gage supply chain would look like, as I discuss below. 
3. Did New Federal Regulations Play a Role? 
Some observers have questioned whether the new mortgage regulations 
mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank) contributed to the contraction in credit. The earliest of those rules, most 
notably the ability-to-repay and qualified mortgage rule promulgated by the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, did not take effect until January 2014. 
(Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 2013, 6408). However, all of the de-
cline in mortgage credit preceded the rule’s effective date and mortgage credit 
actually increased the year the rule went into effect. (Goodman 2017, Figure 
3). Economists who have examined the issue have not found significant evi-
dence that the Dodd-Frank mortgage lending rules further tightened credit, 
either to lower-income households or otherwise. (Bhutta & Ringo 2014; 
Goodman et al. 2014). 
To summarize, the impact of foreclosures on the homeownership rate 
suggests that foreclosures played a role in the contraction of home loans, alt-
hough the exact pathways of that effect are uncertain. Lending fell to young 
adults for other reasons. Meanwhile, lenders became cautious in lending in part 
due to legal liability concerns and in part due to higher servicing costs. The 
outdated supply chain in mortgages also helps explain the reduction in mort-
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gage loans to lower-income households. There is no substantial evidence, 
however, that the new federal mortgage lending standards that went into effect 
in January 2014 contributed to the tightening of credit. 
The increased paucity of credit to underserved borrowers intensified dis-
cussions about how to reverse that trend, consistent with safe and sound lend-
ing. In the next section, I survey a range of proposals by our symposium au-
thors to expand sustainable lending to lower-income homeowners. 
III. TECHNIQUES TO EXPAND THE CREDIT BOX 
The pullback in credit to creditworthy minority and lower-income bor-
rowers has accelerated the search for ways to open up the credit box responsi-
bly. Policy analysts have advanced proposals in that regard ranging from dis-
crete aspects of the mortgage lending process to broader market reforms. For 
instance, ongoing debates over the fate of the Federal National Mortgage As-
sociation (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(“Freddie Mac”) and the future respective roles of the federal government and 
the private sector in housing finance have yielded proposals for increased af-
fordable lending through secondary market reforms. (Housing Finance Reform 
Incubator). In the immediate term, policymakers have instituted reforms to 
ease lenders’ heightened risk aversion in response to investor demands to buy 
back defective mortgages, as Laurie Goodman describes. 
There has also been renewed attention to origination reforms to increase 
lower-income lending. Some proposals have embraced less common loan 
products, such as shared appreciation mortgages designed to replace down 
payment requirements (Caplin et al. 2008, 6) and 15-year fixed-rate mortgages 
that enable households to build equity more quickly. (Arnold 2014; Pinto 
2014). Alternative credit scoring models are being devised for consumers with 
thin credit files. (Baer et al. 2013). Still other efforts have focused on flexible 
lending standards designed to expand credit safely. Some of these programs 
predate the 2008 financial crisis by decades and provide a rich laboratory of 
experimentation, as our authors discuss. 
A. Flexible Underwriting Models 
Around the country, community development financial institutions 
(CDFIs) and other community organizations have worked for years to develop 
flexible yet responsible underwriting models for borrowers with limited in-
come or less than pristine credit. These models are tailored to the specific 
needs of lower-income borrowers, including low down payment requirements, 
payment shock protections, homeowner counseling, and most importantly, 
manageable payments. With funding from foundations including the Ford 
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Foundation, some of these models have now been tested over the full business 
cycle, allowing analysis of what works and what does not. 
In their article, Roberto G. Quercia and Sarah Riley describe lessons from 
one of the nation’s leading affordable lending programs, the Community Ad-
vantage Program (CAP) spearheaded by the Self-Help Credit Union in 
Durham, North Carolina. (Quercia & Riley 2017, 317–19). CAP and its prede-
cessor made over 46,000 30-year fixed-rate mortgages with low down pay-
ments at near-prime interest rates to low- and moderate-income borrowers be-
tween 1983 and 2010. 
In a companion article, Clark L. Ziegler, Elliot Schmiedl, and Thomas 
Callahan identify the determinants of success in the Massachusetts ONE Mort-
gage Program, which is another well-respected community development mort-
gage program serving lower-income and minority households. (Ziegler, 
Schmiedl & Callahan 2017, 349–54). Since 1992, the ONE Mortgage Program 
and its predecessor3 have funded almost 20,000 home purchases through low 
down payment mortgages at favorable interest rates across Massachusetts. The 
following discussion examines the features of those programs in more detail 
and their effect on default rates. 
1. Affordable Payments 
From its inception, the ONE Mortgage Program has placed top emphasis 
on lowering the monthly payment obligations of borrowers. This had two pur-
poses: to expand the number of eligible borrowers and to reduce default risk. 
ONE Mortgage has been able to achieve lower monthly payments through two 
techniques. First, the Program and its lenders offer interest rate discounts and 
subsidies. Second, the risk management architecture of the Program is struc-
tured to dispense with the need for private mortgage insurance. Due to these 
features, ONE Mortgage loans with subsidies have initial monthly payments 
that are up to 25% cheaper than those on Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) mortgages. 
First-time Massachusetts homebuyers earning no more than the area me-
dian income (which was $90,590 in Massachusetts in 2016) qualify for the 
ONE Mortgage Program. All borrowers in that Program receive a 30 basis 
point interest rate discount over the life of the loan. In addition, borrowers who 
make less than 80% of the area median income qualify for an interest rate sub-
sidy, funded by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which further reduces 
monthly payments for the first seven years of the loan. Borrowers do not have 
to repay the subsidy until the sale or transfer of the home and owe 0% interest 
upon repayment. 
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The ONE Mortgage Program also ensures affordability by relieving bor-
rowers of the need to pay costly mortgage insurance. Instead, the Program 
manages the default risk of its borrowers through a loan loss reserve funded by 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and a 20% risk retention position by par-
ticipating lenders. This 20-80 risk-sharing arrangement, combined with the fact 
that originators usually retain the servicing and hold ONE Mortgages in portfo-
lio, give participating lenders a distinct financial stake in the success of those 
loans. 
As I will shortly discuss, this structure has had an impressive track record 
in reducing the risk of foreclosure and liquidation. Expanding the model out-
side of Massachusetts and to a broader array of lenders, however, poses chal-
lenges. Lenders have to be willing to charge lower-income borrowers favora-
ble prime rates and to grant a further 30 basis point discount. Lower origina-
tion costs, as Lisa Davis discusses, would help achieve this calculus. In addi-
tion, a proven record of careful underwriting and low losses would give lend-
ers the confidence to reduce their pricing. Here, the ONE Mortgage Program, 
like the CAP Program, has been able to generate that type of record through 
data-driven analysis of its delinquency and foreclosure rates by university re-
searchers. 
Other aspects of the Massachusetts model might deter more rigid lenders. 
Most mortgage lenders are heavily dependent on secondary market financing, 
which the ONE Mortgage Program does not contemplate. Bank lenders else-
where might be willing to hold loans in portfolio in order to earn Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) credit, and many of them do in Massachusetts. How-
ever, nonbank lenders—who now account for over half of mortgage origina-
tions (McCoy & Wachter 2017a) and who do not owe duties under CRA—will 
likely be less willing. Finally, Laurie Goodman’s reports of lender backlash to 
put-back requests raises the question of how many lenders nationally would 
agree to a 20% risk retention provision. 
That said, the ONE Mortgage Program embodies a highly creative ap-
proach to manageable payments that can be and has been replicated, at least by 
banks, when combined with strong CRA incentives and government-funded 
loan loss reserves. As I now discuss, the Program combines this structure with 
careful underwriting standards to further ensure that the borrowers can afford 
their loans. 
2. Underwriting Criteria 
In recent decades, the borrower characteristics with the strongest value in 
predicting credit risk have been loan-to-value ratios, debt-to-income ratios, and 
credit scores. (Goodman 2017, 236). Precautionary savings are another safe-
guard against default. (Quercia & Riley 2017, 321). Because no one of these 
2017] Foreword: Reviving Access to Mortgage Credit 223 
factors is dispositive, it is possible to trade one characteristic off against anoth-
er in order to balance underwriting flexibility with default risk. This insight 
propelled advances in automated underwriting and also has been used to ex-
pand the credit box. 
One of the most important ways that the CAP and ONE Mortgage Pro-
grams have expanded mortgage credit for lower-income borrowers has been 
through a minimum down payment requirement of 3% for loans on single-
family homes. This low down payment requirement is critical to expanding 
eligibility, because most potential applicants have such low assets that a tradi-
tional down payment requirement of 10% or 20% would prevent them from 
buying homes. (Center for Responsible Lending 2012). At the same time, the 
thin equity cushion backing these loans increases default risk. 
In response to this default concern, the CAP Program reports that despite 
the low down payments of most CAP borrowers (with median loan-to-value 
ratios at origination of 97%), borrowers who experienced negative equity on 
their mortgages when housing prices fell starting in 2007 generally did not de-
fault. Instead, most CAP borrowers who did default experienced liquidity 
problems, such as due to job loss during the Great Recession. This suggests 
that low down payment loan programs can be safely used when combined with 
careful underwriting, savings cushions, and alternative employment opportuni-
ties in the event of job loss. 
In their article, Ziegler, Schmiedl and Callahan provide insight as to how 
the ONE Mortgage Program offsets the inherent default risk in low down pay-
ments with relatively conservative underwriting criteria. In order to qualify, all 
applicants must have a minimum credit score of 660 for loans on condomini-
ums and single-family homes.4 Borrowers seeking to buy either type of proper-
ty must also meet a housing-to-income ratio cap of 36% and a debt-to-income 
ratio cap of 43%. Applicants who exceed a housing-to-income ratio of 33% 
and a debt-to-income ratio of 38%  must further have at least three compensat-
ing factors, which can include a higher credit score, at least two months of re-
serves, stable employment, or a housing payment shock post-purchase of no 
more than 20%.5 
As I discuss below, the ONE Mortgage Program was tempered by the fi-
nancial crisis and its response is instructive. Based on that experience, in Janu-
ary 2010, the Program raised its minimum credit score requirement from 620 
to 660.6 In addition, the Program lowered its maximum housing-to-income 
ratio from 38% to 36% and its maximum debt-to-income ratio from 45% to 
                                                                                                                           
 4 The ONE Mortgage Program has an alternative underwriting test for borrowers with a thin cred-
it history. 
 5 Housing payment shock refers to the difference between an applicant’s monthly housing pay-
ment pre-purchase and the prospective housing payment post-purchase. 
 6 The Program even made a few early loans to borrowers with credit scores in the high 500s. 
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43%. Today, new ONE Mortgage borrowers have an average credit score of 
738, which is fairly demanding and puts them squarely in prime territory. 
These standards have tightened eligibility for the Program, but paid dividends 
in lender confidence and low foreclosure rates. Meanwhile, the Program works 
closely with customers with blemished credit to improve their credit records so 
that they can later qualify for home loans. 
3. Loan Product 
One of the strongest messages by the contributors to this issue is that the 
right loan product is essential to making safe loans. In her analysis of risk lev-
els in mortgage originations from 2001 through 2015, for instance, Goodman 
finds only a slight uptick in borrower risk from 2001 to 2007, even though the 
total risk undertaken by outstanding mortgages increased substantially over 
that period. She attributes that upswing in total risk mostly to the rapid expan-
sion of nontraditional, riskier loan products, including non-fully amortizing 
loans, loans with forty-year amortization schedules, and hybrid adjustable-rate 
mortgages with short reset periods. 
The experience of the CAP and ONE Mortgage Programs confirms her 
finding. As I later discuss, the CAP Program had much lower default rates than 
subprime loans even though CAP borrowers and subprime borrowers had simi-
lar credit profiles (with CAP borrowers having a median credit score at origi-
nation of 681 during the study period). Based on this, Quercia and Riley em-
phasize the importance of CAP’s principal mortgage product—fixed-rate loans 
at near-prime rates—in reducing default risk. Similarly, the ONE Mortgage 
Program in Massachusetts attributes its favorable default rate record to its de-
cision to only offer fixed-rate mortgages. 
4. Homebuyer Education and Counseling 
High-touch education and counseling are a further technique used by the 
ONE Mortgage Program and the CAP Program to reduce default risk. All ONE 
Mortgage homebuyers, for instance, must participate in pre-purchase and post-
purchase counseling to prepare for homeownership. In pre-purchase counsel-
ing, the Program encourages participants to improve their credit profiles, hav-
ing concluded from experience that this approach ensures better repayment 
than loans to borrowers with weaker credit scores. 
Both the ONE Mortgage Program and the CAP Program put high im-
portance on rapid outreach to distressed borrowers. In the ONE Mortgage Pro-
gram, any borrower who becomes 30 days or more delinquent is automatically 
referred to foreclosure prevention counseling. The Program’s sponsors credit 
this early intervention for the Program’s low foreclosure rate. Similarly, the 
CAP Program offered foreclosure prevention counseling to borrowers who 
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were 45 days delinquent or more. (Ding, Quercia & Ratcliffe 2008, 322). This 
counseling was associated with better repayment and lower foreclosure rates. 
(Id. at 318; Quercia & Riley 2017, 328–29). 
In contrast with these two Programs, traditional mortgage lending by 
bank and nonbank lenders do not regularly incorporate pre-purchase or post-
purchase counseling. Lisa Davis cites this omission as one reason why conven-
tional lenders fail to adequately serve lower-income borrowers and proposes a 
new model to remedy the problem, which I describe below. 
B. Outcomes 
Affordable lending operates within tight constraints, posing tradeoffs be-
tween broader access to credit and higher default risk. These tradeoffs raise 
concerns about losses to lenders and investors as well as the effect of foreclo-
sures on borrowers. As our authors report, the ONE Mortgage Program and the 
CAP Program managed these competing considerations successfully, even 
when severely tested by the 2008 financial crisis. 
1. Loan Performance 
The underwriting, loan product, and risk management models just dis-
cussed enabled the ONE Mortgage Program and the CAP Program to report 
successful loan performance rates, even in the wake of the 2008 financial cri-
sis. Since 2008, for instance, the ONE Mortgage Program had a 30+ day delin-
quency rate of about 1 to 2 percentage points above that for prime loans and 
significantly below the delinquency rates for FHA loans and all home loans in 
Massachusetts. Meanwhile, the foreclosure rate for ONE Mortgage loans has 
clocked in at an impressive 1.9%, which is at or below the foreclosure rate for 
all prime loans in Massachusetts. The Program has achieved this record despite 
low down payments and interest rates on its mortgages. 
Similarly, Quercia and Riley report on longitudinal studies that evaluated 
default rates for CAP Program mortgages. During the recent financial crisis 
when default rates spiked, CAP loans performed as well as FHA loans and sig-
nificantly better than prime adjustable-rate loans and subprime loans of all 
types. Only prime fixed-rate loans outperformed CAP loans during this period. 
2. Financial Gains to Borrowers 
In their article, Quercia and Riley also evaluate the wealth-building po-
tential of CAP loans. CAP borrowers were not immune from the volatility in 
housing prices during the housing boom and bust that culminated in the 2008 
financial crisis. Nevertheless, among the CAP borrowers surveyed who had 
sold their homes, 89% sold for what they originally paid or more, while 11% 
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lost money on their sales. The median gain on sale was $26,000, while the me-
dian loss on sale was $10,000. By the end of 2012, the CAP borrowers sur-
veyed had a median net worth of $70,000, with home equity accounting for 
23% of total net worth and retirement accounts accounting for another 40%. 
Meanwhile, comparable renters surveyed had a median net worth of $11,000 in 
2012. That year, fully 70% of the CAP borrowers surveyed had retirement ac-
counts, compared with only 40% for comparable renters. From this and similar 
findings, Quercia and Riley conclude: “CAP homeowners accumulated con-
siderably more wealth than similar renters during the study period and were 
more likely to hold investment assets other than home equity.” (Quercia & Ri-
ley 2017, 324). In addition to confirming home-buying’s wealth-building po-
tential (Herbert, McCue & Sanchez-Moyano 2016, 6–7), this suggests that 
homeownership may be further correlated with diversified wealth gains across 
multiple asset classes, at least for credit programs that are thoughtfully de-
signed. 
IV. BRINGING AFFORDABLE MORTGAGE MODELS TO SCALE 
One of the most pressing challenges for affordable lending programs by 
non-profits and community development financial institutions (CDFIs) lies in 
bringing those programs to scale. We have seen that the risk management 
structure of the ONE Mortgage Program does not fit the normal business mod-
el of commercial mortgage lenders, most of whom originate for sale to the 
secondary market. Meanwhile, standardization demands by the Federal Na-
tional Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) and political controversies surrounding 
their conservatorship and the solvency of the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) have placed other, serious limitations on the replication of programs 
such as ONE Mortgage and the Community Advantage Program (CAP) na-
tionwide. 
In her contribution to this issue, Lisa Davis makes the further point that 
the community development sector is still a cottage industry and not well inte-
grated into the secondary market. Marketing costs and commissions make it 
too expensive for big banks to satisfy demand by creditworthy lower-income 
households for mortgage loans. (Davis 2017, 303, 305). 
To address these issues, Davis describes a new vision for reorganizing af-
fordable lending that is designed to expand responsible credit to qualified low- 
and moderate-income borrowers. One major objective is to reduce origination 
costs. Davis would accomplish that by providing outreach and marketing 
through the existing housing counseling system instead of the costly marketing 
structure of loan officers and brokers used by banks and mortgage brokers. To 
further reduce costs, she would shift the marketing of home loans to a technol-
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ogy platform where applicants could apply online. This same technology plat-
form would replace the current paper-based system for loan production and 
connect housing counseling agencies to CDFIs and secondary market buyers. 
A related aspect of her proposal would integrate housing counseling with 
the loan production process and link counseling agencies all the way through 
to investors. This way, the risk reduction benefits of counseling could be re-
flected in secondary market pricing. In this new supply chain, housing counsel-
ing agencies would refer loan applicants to CDFIs or credit unions, which 
would originate mortgages at reduced cost. As Davis explains, there are al-
ready two initiatives along these lines—one by the NeighborWorks Organiza-
tion Shop Program and the other by the National Mortgage Collaborative in 
tandem with the CDFI Springboard—that are seeking to create a national mar-
ketplace of CDFIs, incorporating housing counselors, to create a wholesale 
conduit for home loans. 
In addition to cost reduction and an improved supply chain, Davis’ pro-
posal has two more benefits that are key to the success of affordable lending. 
Housing counselors would finally have assurances of private compensation 
through fees paid by originators or wholesale lenders. That compensation 
would provide a way, in turn, of delivering professional housing counseling at 
scale—along with its proven risk reduction benefits—to lower-income home-
buyers. 
V. BROADER MACROECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In the last segment of this issue, we turn to broader macroeconomic and 
housing market factors that encourage or retard responsible access to credit. 
These considerations have received short shrift in policy discussions so far. 
Three of the articles in this issue bring needed attention to this topic. 
Susan Wachter and I argue that better access to credit for ordinary house-
holds depends on reducing the boom-bust cycles that plague home prices and 
housing finance. (McCoy & Wachter 2017b, 362). During the easy credit phase 
of the cycle, lenders extend excessive numbers of mortgage loans with height-
ened credit risk. Later, after the bubble bursts and default rates spike, banks 
become overly cautious in lending, both to preserve capital and out of fear of 
put-back exposure on future loans. This contraction in credit is so severe that 
even creditworthy consumers with modest incomes cannot count on getting 
loans. That is the situation we find ourselves in today. 
This volatility undermines healthy access to credit and building wealth. 
(Herbert, McCue & Sanchez-Moyano 2016, 1). In the aftermath of a mortgage 
bubble and the inevitable recession, millions of homeowners may lose their 
homes to foreclosure—some due to reckless loans and others due to unem-
ployment—leaving them worse off financially than before. Damaged credit 
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will block them from qualifying from another mortgage for at least several 
years. Meanwhile, tight lending standards will cause other aspiring homeown-
ers who do have good credit to be turned down for loans, denying them the 
chance to build home equity. Current borrowers who hold onto their homes 
will suffer falling home values unless they can ride out the recovery and do not 
live in areas in long-term decline. Because homeownership historically has 
been the most powerful engine of wealth for lower-income and minority fami-
lies, these peaks and troughs exacerbate the wealth gap. 
Wachter and I propose addressing cyclicality through a three-pronged ap-
proach. First, society needs to agree that safe and affordable credit, not maxi-
mum loan volumes, is the top policy goal. Second, policymakers need to root 
out market and regulatory practices and policies that exacerbate swings in the 
housing finance cycle. Finally, regulators should expand their use of counter-
cyclical tools to modulate the highs and lows of the mortgage cycle. These 
tools—which include the ability-to-repay rule promulgated by the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 2013, 
6408), countercyclical capital provisions, and countercyclical loan loss re-
quirements—are in place but have not been implemented across the board. 
Quercia and Riley similarly highlight broader design considerations that 
can help shield borrowers against market booms and busts. Their analysis of 
Community Advantage Program (CAP) loans shows that the houses that 
weathered the housing price decline the best were less expensive, single-family 
homes located in wealthier neighborhoods with somewhat older housing stock. 
Thus, the authors recommend that affordable homeownership programs identi-
fy modestly priced homes in these neighborhoods for homebuyers’ considera-
tion. To guard against employment shocks, they also counsel homebuyers to 
search in communities with stable and diverse job opportunities. The timing of 
purchases similarly matters, in their view. Consumers should be especially 
cautious about home purchases at the top of the market or when they plan to 
sell in a few years. Lenders can reinforce this caution by modifying their un-
derwriting models to expand credit when owner-occupied homes are underval-
ued compared to rents and to tighten it when owning is costly compared to 
renting. Finally, Quercia and Riley advocate post-purchase counseling and 
specialty servicing, which have been proven useful in avoiding defaults and 
resolving defaults at lower cost. 
Unlike McCoy and Wachter’s recommendations, which are aimed at 
Congress and federal regulators, the policy proposals advanced by Quercia and 
Riley require decentralized local implementation by real estate and lending 
professionals. For instance, housing counselors and real estate agents would be 
pivotal to matching potential homebuyers with homes in appropriate communi-
ties. Housing counselors would also be a crucial source of trusted advice about 
the timing risks of any purchase. 
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Training tens of thousands of realtors and counselors to advise on appro-
priate neighborhoods and communities would be a challenge. Teaching hous-
ing counselors to predict real estate bubbles while they are inflating (which 
economists do not even do well) would pose even greater difficulty. At the 
very least, this would necessitate a “more robust framework” of the type that 
Quercia and Riley envision, involving “the participation of a variety of stake-
holders, including not only the lender but realtors, economists and other mar-
ket analysts, specialty servicers, and financial educators and counselors.” 
(Quercia & Riley 2017, 329). 
The financial incentives of market actors would also have to be realigned 
to comport with the recommendations put forward by Quercia and Riley. 
Would realtors have the right financial incentives to guide lower-income 
homebuyers toward cheaper homes in richer neighborhoods? Would lenders 
facing stiff competition be willing to tighten credit when home purchases are 
becoming costly relative to rents? The traditional competitive dynamics of 
housing booms and busts tell us otherwise: i.e., lenders will relax credit, not 
tighten it, during housing bubbles (Levitin & Wachter 2015, 1250; Wachter 
2016, 211) unless forced to scale back by regulators. 
Nothing in this diminishes the importance of the recommendations made 
by Quercia and Riley. What it does suggest, however, is that careful thought 
needs to be given to a fuller set of incentives and institutional and legal ar-
rangements if their proposals are to come to life. The same is true for Davis’ 
proposal for lenders to pay housing counselors, which could revive some of the 
perverse incentives faced by mortgage brokers pre-crisis if not properly de-
signed. 
We close our issue with remarks by our symposium keynote speaker, Mi-
chael A. Stegman, who steps back and reminds us that homeownership finance 
is just one part of the larger ecosystem of residential shelter. (Stegman 2017, 
395–96). Homeownership and rental housing, he states, “are two sides of the 
same coin” and “pressures and problems in one have implications for the oth-
er.” (Id., 396). Recent experience shows that when eligibility requirements for 
home mortgages become too tight, demand for rental housing rises. According 
to the Harvard Joint Center on Housing Studies, the last ten years ushered in 9 
million additional renters, which was the largest increase in one decade on rec-
ord. (Joint Center for Housing Studies 2016, 25). Even though the amount of 
rental units is expanding, demand for affordable rentals has outstripped supply, 
and over 60% of apartments in the top 11 metropolitan areas are too expensive 
for the average renter. (NYU Furman Center 2015, 15). 
Stegman criticizes federal budgetary policy for overspending on home-
ownership subsidies, especially given the fact that rental families, on average, 
make only about half the income of families headed by homeowners. (Miller 
2014). There are a number of tried and trusted policies that could substantially 
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reverse the rental gap and ameliorate homelessness for a relatively modest 
budget outlay if expanded. Based on this set of research findings, Stegman 
recommends increasing the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit to build 350,000 
to 400,000 more affordable rental housing units over the next ten years; ending 
chronic homelessness through greater funding for rapid rehousing and longer-
term housing vouchers; granting mobility vouchers to assist impoverished fam-
ilies to move to wealthier neighborhoods where jobs and good schools are 
more available; and increasing carrots and sticks to cities and states to reduce 
regulatory hurdles to affordable rental  housing. 
CONCLUSION 
Now, with the benefit of hindsight, we know that homeownership is a 
riskier investment than previously realized. Still, homeownership remains a 
proven path to increased wealth on balance for lower-income households. The 
task, then, is to expand mortgage credit to qualified, underserved households 
while increasing their chance of repayment and successful homeownership. 
That job appears daunting, now that lenders and investors have become 
gun-shy of affordable lending. But in reality, there are a number of reasonable 
reforms that could achieve greater access while containing default risk. In this 
symposium issue, some of the nation’s leading experts in housing and mort-
gage finance advance proposals to achieve these twin goals. 
Chief among these are underwriting changes to open up the credit box 
while minimizing default risk. These include strategies to reduce down pay-
ments safely and to keep monthly payments manageable. Several authors high-
lighted the importance of pre-purchase counseling in preparing applicants for 
the financial demands of homeownership while strengthening their credit his-
tories. Similarly, rapid foreclosure prevention counseling has been shown to 
reduce foreclosures dramatically for borrowers who miss payments. The au-
thors further stress the importance of the fixed-rate loans in making safe mort-
gages. Using these lending models, it is possible for lenders to reach further 
down the income and credit spectrum while maintaining an acceptable level of 
default risk. 
Several of the authors proposed larger, structural changes to the lending 
industry, mortgage regulation, and housing finance to remove artificial institu-
tional barriers to the flow of responsible credit. In the short term, these include 
countercyclical rules to minimize credit bubbles and investor reforms to allevi-
ate lenders’ liability concerns for inadvertent misrepresentations and minor 
underwriting errors affecting loans. More boldly, several of the authors ad-
vanced a new vision of mortgage finance, in which housing counselors, real 
estate professionals, and economists would be integrated into the mortgage 
supply chain to produce better borrowing decisions at favorable pricing. Clos-
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ing the circle, ensuring an adequate supply of affordable rentals would give 
lower-income households the flexi bility they need to make the right housing 
decisions for their personal circumstances at each stage of their lives. 
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